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Abstract 
This article reports the results of research that uses policy network theory and advocacy 
coalition theory to deduce the implications for the future of public policy in EU Member 
States of king trends: all those technological, economic, environmental and social trends 
that can be empirically verified, affect the lives of large numbers of people and are 
expected by relevant experts to continue for at least the next 20 years. The resulting policy 
implications can be summarized as more assertive security policies, more business-friendly 
economic policies, more liberal social policies and increased public spending.  
 
1 
 
Introduction 
Where is public policy in European countries heading? Will we get tax cuts or better public 
services? How will pensioners fare? Will public policy become more and more attuned to the 
needs of business at the expense of other groups? Will public policy become more Europeanized 
and globalized? 
Although ultimately we cannot tell for sure because there are too many unknowables, it is 
possible to obtain a theoretically-informed synoptic picture of the matrix of long-term pressures 
exerted on public policy by major long-term technological, economic, environmental and social 
trends. This article sets out the results of a major research project designed to do just this for the 
Member States of the European Union (Compston 2006). The 12 long-term policy implications 
that emerge can be summarised as more assertive security policies, more business-friendly 
economic policies, more liberal social policies and increased public spending. 
The following sections describe in turn my theoretical approach, my methodology, and 
results of applying this methodology.   
Theory 
My approach is based on two of the most prominent contemporary theories of policy-making: 
policy network theory and 6DEDWLHU¶V Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF).  
The main defining characteristic of policy network theory is its focus on the patterns of 
formal and informal contacts and relationships between government and non-government 
decision-makers (policy actors) as influences on policy-making (Parsons 1995: 185). Perhaps the 
most prominent version, and the one on which I shall concentrate, is that put forward by Rod 
Rhodes. This views policy-making as consisting largely of a process of exchanges of resources 
XVLQJVSHFLILFSROLWLFDOVWUDWHJLHVZLWKLQXQGHUVWRRGµUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶5KRGHV-5).  
As the factors that determine policy outcomes in what is effectively a model of bargaining, 
namely bargaining strategies, power resources and coalition possibilities, also determine the 
membership of the policy network (Dowding 1995), it follows that if these characteristics of 
policy actors GRQ¶WFKDQJHSROLF\shifts will remain fairly small, since network membership and 
the balance of power among network members will remain much the same. This means that for 
major policy change to occur there must first be pre-existing changes in the views, bargaining 
strategies, power resources or coalition possibilities of network members. Such changes are 
caused mainly if not exclusively by developments and events external to policy networks 
themselves. An example will make this clear. Business groups would be expected to gain 
bargaining power as the internationalisation of production renders more plausible corporate 
threats to shift investment elsewhere if their policy demands are not met, which in turn implies 
greater pressure on governments to shift public policy in a pro-business direction, but the driver 
for this change, the internationalisation of production, is a factor external to the network.  
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) was developed by Paul Sabatier as a way of 
bringing into focus the role of ideas within a holistic theory of policy-making. It portrays public 
policy as the outcome of interactions within policy subsystems (networks) between contending 
advocacy coalitions each of which is bound together by common beliefs about what policy 
should be, such as free traders and protectionists in relation to trade, or hawks and doves in 
relation to defence (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Sabatier sees policy change as resulting 
from two main sources. The first of these is policy-oriented learning within and between 
2 
 
advocacy coalitions. Secondary aspects of coalition belief systems ± beliefs about the appropriate 
instruments with which to implement their policy core - are most affected by this, with policy 
cores themselves being less affected and deep cores ± the fundamental beliefs and axioms on 
which the policy core is based - rarely affected at all. Major policy changes, by contrast, are seen 
as the result of external perturbations - changes in government, turnover of personnel in key 
positions and changes in relevant socio-economic conditions ± that alter the composition and/or 
resources of the contending advocacy coalitions.  
In other words, both policy network theory and advocacy coalition theory see major policy 
change as being caused by the impact of external developments and events on policy networks. It 
follows that if we can ascertain what these events are going to be, we should be able to get some 
idea of the direction of future policy change through examining their impact on policy actors, 
networks and advocacy coalitions. 
But there is a problem. It is generally impossible to predict what these events are going to 
be, especially in the long term. It is difficult to predict the results of the next election, for 
example, let alone a sequence of future elections. We are constantly subjected to a blizzard of 
unforeseen events. How then can policy network theory and advocacy coalition theory be used to 
obtain an indication of the directions in which public policy is likely to move? 
The key insight is the observation that there is at least one class of events that can be 
predicted, namely the events that constitute major long-term technological, economic, 
environmental and social trends. More specifically, it is possible to predict the events that 
constitute trends that are well-HVWDEOLVKHGVLJQLILFDQWIRUSHRSOH¶VOLYHVDQGH[SHFWHGE\H[SHUWV
to continue for the next 20 years or so. These I call king trends to stress their significance and 
distinguish them from other trends. We can predict with confidence, for example, that, barring 
major disruptions such as an energy crisis, GDP and incomes will continue to rise. We can 
predict that international trade and capital movements will expand. We can predict that people 
aged 65 or over will become a greater proportion of the population as time goes on. We can 
predict that global warming will continue. Many such trends can be identified. 
 Given this, in principle we can then go on to predict how these trends are likely to affect 
policy actors and networks and, through this, influence the future direction of public policy. To 
show how this can be done I take SabatieU¶V$&)DVP\SRLQWRIGHSDUWXUHEXWWKHORJLFDSSOLHV
equally to network theory.  
Recall that, according to Sabatier, major policy changes are the result of external 
perturbations that alter the composition and/or resources of contending advocacy coalitions.  
For the composition of an advocacy coalition to change there must be (a) a change in the 
membership of the policy network as a whole, for example due to powerful multinational firms 
entering or leaving the country, or (b) a change in the views of one or more policy actors that 
leads them to switch coalitions, such as a political party (or its leadership) becoming convinced 
that global warming is real and consequently joining environmentalist coalitions in areas such as 
transport policy.  
For the resources of an advocacy coalition to change, logically there must either be a 
change in its composition, as discussed above, or a change in the resources of one or more of its 
members. Internationalization of production, for example, would be expected to add to the 
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resources of pro-business coalitions by enabling their business members more plausibly to 
threaten to redirect investment to other countries if their policy demands are not met.  
In short, we can establish how king trends affect the composition and/or resources of 
contending advocacy coalitions if we can establish how these trends affect policy network 
composition and/or the views and/or resources of individual policy actors. This means 
identifying how king trends (a) cause policy actors to enter and leave policy networks, (b) alter 
the views of one or more policy actors, or (c) alter the resources of one or more policy actors. 
The final step is to identify the implications of this for the direction of public policy. Once 
we can identify changes in policy network composition and/or the views and/or resources of 
policy actors, we can use the provisions of the ACF (or network theory) to deduce the direction 
in which these changes would be expected to push public policy, other things being equal. More 
specifically, altering network composition and/or the views and/or resources of individual policy 
actors would be expected to lead to different policy outcomes than would have occurred without 
these changes. If the bargaining resources of business vis a vis national governments increase, 
for example, we can predict that pressure on public policy to become more pro-business will 
grow as time goes on, other things being equal. Similar predictions can be made in relation to the 
implications for public policy of changes in policy network composition and in the policy views 
of policy actors. 
This approach can be made clearer by conceptualizing the direction of policy change as the 
resultant of a parallelogram of pressures brought to bear by the views, resources and political 
strategies of relevant policy actors. If these views, resources and strategies remain the same, the 
main lines of public policy remain the same. When they alter, the balance of pressures alters and 
public policy changes accordingly. If we can identify how king trends alter the views, resources 
and strategies of policy actors ± or at least their resources ± we should be able to deduce changes 
to one or more lines of pressure operating on public policy and therefore specify not the net 
resultant policy change, because the parallelogram of pressures is being inflected by short-term 
trends and fluctuations as well as by individual events and personalities, but the directions in 
which the underlying king trends are pushing public policy before being inflected by shorter-
term pressures. 
Methodology 
Putting my approach into practice for European countries involves four main steps: (1) 
identification of king trends, (2) identification of policy actors and their resources, (3) evaluation 
of the effects of these trends on policy actors, and (4) evaluation of the direction of consequent 
pressures on public policy. 
1. Identification of King Trends 
To be predictable, a trend must be believed to be likely to continue well into the future. To be of 
interest, it must be significant in some way. To be included in the analysis as a king trend, 
therefore, a trend must meet three conditions: 
1. Its existence as a major current trend in European democracies such as Britain, France and 
Germany must be convincingly verified; 
2. There must be strong evidence that it directly affects the lives of a large number of people in 
a significant way; 
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3. It must be expected by relevant experts to be likely to continue operating for at least the next 
20 years, for example because it has been operating for a very long time already, because the 
factors sustaining it are themselves expected to continue to operate, or because there are no 
obvious countervailing factors on the horizon. 
Table 1 lists the 19 trends that meet all three criteria and can therefore be classified as king 
trends. For more details see Compston 2006. 
 
Table 1. Identifiable king trends 
Type  Trend 
Development and 
spread of 
technological 
innovation  
1. Information and communications technology 
2. Biotechnology 
3. Healthcare technology 
4. Military technology  
Economic trends 5. Growth and diversification of production and consumption 
6. Greater energy use 
7. Increasing mobility 
8. The shift to services  
9. 7KHJURZWKRIZRPHQ¶VHPSOR\PHQW 
10. The expansion of trade 
11. The internationalisation of production 
12. The internationalisation of finance 
13. The expansion of mass media 
Environmental trends 14. Climate change 
Social trends 15. Population ageing 
16. Rising levels of education 
17. Smaller households  
18. Secularisation 
19. Sexual liberalisation 
 
2. Identification of Policy Actors and Resources 
The next step is to identify the relevant policy actors, by which is meant those individuals and 
groups who take an interest in the policy issues raised by the trend under consideration or who 
are affected by the trend or its consequences. Table 2 sets out the indicative policy network 
model used as a point of departure for identifying the specific policy networks that are affected 
by each king trend. It focuses mainly on policy actors, resources and strategies because policy 
views tend to be specific to the policy area being analyzed and are therefore not suited to 
inclusion in a generic model. 7KH PRGHO DGDSWV 6DEDWLHU¶V PRGHO RI SROLF\ VXEV\VWHPV 
(networks) to the European context and includes eight different types of policy actor, each of 
which possesses characteristic types of policy resources that can be used in political exchange 
over public policy. The model also includes the electorate as a sort of quasi-policy actor on the 
grounds that political executives often alter public policy in direct response to signals from the 
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electorate via public opinion polls, focus groups, direct action such as demonstrations, and 
election results. For ease of exposition it is focused mainly on the level of the nation state, but 
this should not obscure the fact that other levels of governance are also important: in many areas 
the EU level is dominant, while in other areas subnational levels of government take the lead.  
 
Table 2. Generic policy network 
Policy actor Power resources 
Political executive: head of 
government (and possibly head of 
state) plus relevant minister(s), and 
their parties 
Legal authority, command of civil service expertise, 
support within their party, support within cabinet, 
support within the legislature, electoral support 
Other politicians: opposition parties, 
faction leaders/rebels, leaders at 
European level, sub-national level, 
foreign leaders 
Relevant expertise, legal authority, capacity to deliver 
legislative support, perceived capacity to deliver 
popular support, capacity to take legal action, 
capacity to apply diplomatic, economic or military 
pressure 
Civil servants: lead ministry/agency, 
finance ministry, other ministries and 
agencies, European, subnational, 
international  
Access to the political executive, relevant expertise, 
the role of drafting policy proposals, the capacity to 
facilitate or obstruct policy implementation, 
independent legal authority 
Judges and regulators Legal authority 
Business, especially corporations Access to the political executive and civil servants, 
relevant expertise, money, capacity to facilitate or 
obstruct policy implementation, capacity to take legal 
action, capacity to take direct action 
Non-government organizations: 
employers and  unions, other interest 
groups, social movements such as 
greens; national, sectoral, European, 
sub-national 
Access to the political executive and civil servants, 
relevant expertise, money, capacity to facilitate or 
obstruct policy implementation, perceived capacity to 
deliver popular support, capacity to take legal action, 
capacity to take direct action 
Media (television, press)  Perceived capacity to deliver popular support 
Non-government experts  Relevant expertise 
Electorate Votes, capacity to facilitate or obstruct policy 
implementation, capacity to take direct action 
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3. Evaluation of the Effects of Each Trend on Policy Actors 
Once a king trend is identified, the next step is to investigate the extent to which it leads either to 
policy actors entering or leaving policy networks or to changes in their views or resources. This 
involves using the official and academic expert literature relating to the king trend under 
consideration to help extrapolate causal connections forward from the king trend in order to 
identify impacts on network composition or on the views or resources of policy actors. Since 
governments often alter public policy in direct response to signals from the electorate, such as 
opinion polls, due to their desire for re-election, the study also examines the impact of king 
trends on factors that influence electoral turnout and voter choice.  
4. Evaluation of the Direction of Consequent Pressures on Public Policy  
Once it is clear how each trend affects the composition of policy networks and the views and 
resources of policy actors, the final step is to unpack the implications of these effects for the 
direction of public policy.  
According to policy network theory the appearance of a new policy actor, or a significant 
strengthening of their resources, should lead to pressure for public policy to move in the 
direction desired by that policy actor, other things being equal. Conversely, the disappearance of 
a policy actor from a network, or a significant weakening in their resources, should lessen or 
remove pressure for public policy to move in their direction. Increasing the bargaining power of 
corporations, for example, would be expected to lead to increased pressure on public policy in 
move in a pro-business direction, while a decline in the membership of mainstream churches 
would be expected to reduce pressure for public policy to conform to traditional Christian values.  
For Sabatier, however, advocacy coalitions are the focus rather than individual policy 
actors, and major policy change is seen as the result of changes in the composition and resources 
of contending advocacy coalitions. This means that before the ACF can be applied, it is 
necessary to draw out the implications for advocacy coalitions of the impact of king trends on 
policy actors. For example, the implications of any increase in the policy-relevant resources of 
corporations would need to be translated into changes in the resources of contending advocacy 
coalitions in areas such as economic policy and environmental policy. Once this is done, 
conclusions can be drawn concerning the pressure exerted by these changes on the direction of 
public policy. If the resources of an advocacy coalition increase as a result of the impact of long-
term trends, we would expect that this would increase pressure for the content of public policy to 
move closer to that aGYRFDF\FRDOLWLRQ¶VSROLF\ FRUH RWKHU WKLQJVEHLQJ HTXDO ,I DQ DGYRFDF\
FRDOLWLRQ¶V UHVRXUFHV GLPLQLVK IRU H[DPSOH EHFDXVH D PHPEHU OHDYHV ZH ZRXOG H[SHFW D
lessening of pressure for public policy to move in its direction.  
A similar logic can be applied to changes in the factors that influence electoral turnout and 
voter choice insofar as these changes are caused by king trends, as these can be translated into 
greater or lesser electoral pressure for particular types of policies. A growing preponderance of 
relatively old people in the electorate, for example, would be expected to lead to greater electoral 
pressure for good quality services for the elderly, other things being equal.  
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Results 
Using the above procedure yielded over a hundred findings concerning the policy implications of 
HDFKNLQJWUHQGFRQVLGHUHGLQGLYLGXDOO\RQDQµRWKHUWKLQJVEHLQJHTXDO¶EDVLV (Compston 2006). 
These can be condensed into 12 points that, taken together, constitute an integrated baseline 
projection of the net directions in which king trends considered as a whole are pushing public 
policy in EU countries before these pressures are inflected by events, personalities and other 
short-term and unpredictable factors. This is as close as we can get to a synoptic view of the 
long-term future direction of public policy.  
At the most general level, the net policy implications of the 19 king trends can be 
summarized as more assertive security policies, more business-friendly economic policies, more 
liberal social policies and increased public spending. To understand what this means, however, it 
is necessary to look beyond these four general headings to the 12 specific policy implications 
that they cover.  
More Assertive Security Policies 
1. More Assertive Foreign and Security Policies. 
EU governments have both the incentive and the opportunity to implement more assertive 
foreign and security policies in coming years except in relation to major trading partners. The 
perceived threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks on 
vital computer systems and dependence on energy imports are growing, while ever-increasing 
levels of production create a constant need to open up new markets in other countries. At the 
same time the development of precision warfare techniques capable of quick victories with few 
or no casualties and minimum destructiveness reduces the electoral cost of military action. The 
result is likely to be more aggressive and interventionist foreign and security policies except in 
relation to major trading partners, as the expansion of international trade and production 
networks with these countries increases the domestic economic costs of their being disrupted by 
military action. 
2. More Intrusive and Internationalized Law Enforcement. 
EU governments also have both the incentive and opportunity to implement more vigorous 
measures against crime. The king trends operating today imply rising crime in a number of 
respects. There is the perception that developments in information and communications 
technology (ICT) are leading to increasing levels of computer crime. The expansion of trade and 
the internationalization of production and finance are thought to be increasing the incidence of 
international crime such as fraud and money laundering. Increasing independence of mind due to 
rising levels of education implies rising levels of white-collar crime as increasing numbers of 
people decide for themselves whether to obey the law. There is evidence that children brought up 
in one-parent families are more likely to commit crime than children from two-parent families, 
which implies that the increasing incidence of one-parent families means rising crime, other 
things being equal, although this tendency is offset somewhat by the declining proportion in the 
population of the category of people most likely to commit crime, namely young men, due to 
population ageing. And secularization weakens inhibitions against crime and anti-social behavior 
by weakening the hold of Christian morality. At the same time the potential effectiveness of law 
enforcement is being increased by improvements in surveillance technology. The likely results 
are moves to tighten regulation of ICT, implement tighter border controls, permit law 
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enforcement agencies to increase their use of surveillance, introduce harsher penalties for 
criminal acts, and expand international cooperation in law enforcement.  
More Business-Friendly Policies 
The king trends operating today strengthen the economic and electoral incentives for 
governments to shift public policy in a more business-friendly direction in a number of ways, 
although not all of these are motivated solely by a concern to help business and their effects are 
not necessarily beneficial only to business. We begin by looking at the policy implications 
relating to specific types of firms and sectors. 
3. More Favorable Policies towards Expanding Firms and Sectors. 
As time goes on some types of business become more significant for growth and employment, 
thus increasing the economic and electoral incentives for governments to do what they can to 
assist them and take advantage of what they do, while others become less economically 
significant and therefore of lesser political importance except to the extent that their difficulties 
cause economic or social disruption. The main types of expanding firms and sectors are hi-tech 
firms, the services sector in general, transnational companies (TNCs), exporters, international 
financial institutions and media companies. Increasing international competition means that 
import-competing firms are the ones most at risk of sudden meltdown. 
The increasing significance of technological developments in areas such as ICT, 
biotechnology and healthcare strengthen the incentives for governments to implement more 
vigorous measures to assist firms in these areas, for instance by expanding financial incentives 
for technology-rich incoming foreign investment, adapting process and product regulation in 
ways that facilitate the development and use of new technologies (for example by loosening 
restrictions on the use of genetic tests by insurers and employees as these tests become more 
reliable), and expanding direct financial incentives such as tax breaks for R&D. The growing 
economic significance of new technology also provides incentives for governments to encourage 
other businesses to use these technologies, expand education and training so that employees are 
appropriately skilled in their use, and intensify efforts to protect businesses from cybercrime.  
The increasing economic importance of services relative to manufacturing strengthen the 
incentives for governments to make public policy more services-friendly in areas such as 
regulation, education and training, access to government services, technical and generic 
assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises, tax policy and financial support. Similarly, the 
increasing economic value of the media industry increases the incentives for governments to 
make public policy more favorable towards media interests in areas such as regulation and 
industry assistance. 
The increasing economic importance of export industries, combined with growing 
competition for foreign markets and increasing competition from imports for domestic import-
competing industries, strengthen the incentives for governments to assist export and import-
competing producers to compete by means such as improving infrastructure, expanding 
education and training, providing additional assistance with R&D, increasing direct financial aid, 
implementing more vigorous measures to open up new markets in foreign countries, cutting 
HPSOR\HUV¶ VRFLDO FRQWULEXWLRQV DQG FRUSRUDWLRQ WD[ WDNLQJ VWHSV WR VHFXUH ZDJH UHVWUDLQW
reforming employment regulation to increase labor flexibility, and reducing the costs to business 
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of environmental regulation. An alternative strategy is to strengthen international labor and 
environmental standards in order to restrict low-cost competition in these areas. 
The increasing economic importance of TNCs and inward foreign investment, plus the 
increasing ability of resident companies to move production elsewhere, strengthen the incentives 
for governments to implement policies designed to benefit TNCs such as further liberalization of 
investment restrictions and greater incentives for inward foreign investment as well as the 
policies already mentioned in the areas of technology, tax, education, infrastructure, labor costs, 
employment regulation, environmental regulation and trade policy. At the same time the pressure 
exerted on public policy by TNC threats to withhold investment, or move it elsewhere, can be 
countered by using international agreements to limit locational competition by means such as 
harmonizing tax regimes, investment regulation and labor and environmental standards, although 
progress in this DUHDLVOLNHO\WREHOLPLWHGE\WKHRSSRVLWLRQRIFXUUHQWµZLQQHUV¶LQWKHVHILHOGV
to signing international agreements that remove their comparative advantages. 
The increasing economic importance of TNCs also implies a change in the economic 
policy instruments used by governments, since the ability of TNCs to shift profits elsewhere 
undermines tax revenue and means that demand management policies have less impact, while 
their currency dealings undermine exchange rate policy, their capacity to shift production 
elsewhere undermines industrial policy, and their ability to borrow elsewhere or transfer 
domestic borrowings elsewhere means that monetary policy has less impact on credit. In these 
circumstances measures to stimulate business activity, such as the ones listed above, become 
increasingly important as policy instruments. 
The increasing economic importance of international financial markets, combined with the 
financial importance for governments of minimizing interest rates on government debt, increase 
the incentives for governments to implement more business-friendly policies as defined by 
financial markets. Apart from those listed above this means strict policies to control inflation, 
which are already in place in the EU, and further international financial liberalization. However 
the extent to which governments will pursue further financial liberalization is limited by the fact 
that increasing financial internationalization increases the likelihood and severity of international 
financial crises by tightening international links that facilitate the transmission of financial 
shocks, increasing the scale and speed of international financial flows, expanding the 
interdependencies between increasingly large and complex financial institutions, and facilitating 
the growth of financial derivatives. For these reasons, and because there have been a number of 
serious international financial crises in recent years, governments are increasingly likely to act 
together to strengthen prudential regulation of financial institutions, as they have done just 
recently with the Basel 2 agreement.  
So far it sounds like business has it all its own way, but in fact it is not all one-way traffic 
due to the emergence and growth of the anti-globalization movement in response to growing 
awareness of the downside of increasing economic internationalization (globalization), such as 
downward pressure on labor and environmental standards, threats to welfare states and economic 
damage to poor countries. For this reason the anti-globalization movement is likely to grow as 
economic internationalization develops just as trade unions expanded as industrialization 
progressed. Furthermore its political efficacy is increasing as developments in ICT improve the 
capacity of spatially-dispersed groups to coordinate at a distance. The consequence of this is 
increasing pressure on governments to counter the perceived ill effects of economic 
internationalization, for example by expanding the use of international agreements to regulate 
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locational competition. Although there is little indication that this pressure will be sufficient to 
neutralize the pressures exerted on public policy by the economic and electoral implications of 
the growth of export industries, TNCs and international financial institutions, in part because, as 
we shall see, the policy leverage of trade unions is being eroded, it does seem likely to reduce 
their impact in areas such as tax, trade policy, and employment and environmental regulation. 
4. Priority For Securing Energy Supplies Over Mitigating Climate Change. 
The increasing dependence of most EU countries on energy imports as energy use increases and 
domestic energy sources dwindle, combined with the centrality of energy to economic growth 
and societal functioning in general, increases the economic and electoral incentives for 
governments to implement more vigorous measures to ensure security of energy supply. This 
spur to action will be greatly strengthened if official forecasts that oil production will not peak 
until 2030 are wrong and in fact production peaks before then, as the continued increase in 
demand for oil, combined with falling supply, would lead to steadily rising oil prices that would 
raise price inflation and input costs while reducing non-oil demand and investment, leading to 
lower levels of economic activity and lower tax revenues, which in turn tend to lead among other 
things to bigger budget deficits, higher interest rates, higher unemployment, a deterioration in the 
balance of payments and lower exchange rates. 
At the same time there is increasing evidence that climate change is real and that it is 
caused largely by the use of fossil fuels. This means increasing pressure on governments to take 
steps to reduce carbon emissions so as to avoid serious environmental and economic problems in 
the future, which implies increasing pressure on EU and other governments to reduce the use of 
fossil fuels. 
Since economic growth is vital to the short-term electoral prospects of governments, 
however, measures to mitigate climate change are likely to be restricted to those that do not 
significantly constrain economic growth by making energy more expensive. At the same time 
governments will want to avoid measures that expand energy supply but exacerbate climate 
change. This means that the policies of choice are likely to be those that contribute both to 
energy security and to mitigating climate change at the same time, in particular policies designed 
to improve energy efficiency, encourage the development and use of alternative energy sources 
including nuclear power and renewables, shift passengers and freight to low carbon modes of 
transport, and encourage the substitution of communications for personal travel.  
Ultimately, however, the priority given by EU and other governments to economic growth 
and re-election means that other policies will also be used to ensure energy security regardless of 
environmental considerations, such as diversifying foreign energy sources and supply routes and 
increasing diplomatic and military pressure on recalcitrant foreign governments.  
What this means is that it is very unlikely that enough will be done to halt climate change. 
This in turn means that from time to time there will be natural disasters that can be attributed to 
climate change, each of which will stimulate adoption of more vigorous measures to mitigate 
climate change providing that these do not significantly obstruct economic growth. It also means 
that over time increasing pressure from those who are directly disadvantaged by climate change 
will lead governments to adopt more vigorous measures to adapt to it, for example by improving 
flood defenses.    
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5. More Vigorous Measures to Increase the Size and Quality of the Labour Force. 
One of the principal implications of population ageing is a reduction in the working-age 
population as a proportion of the total population. Other things being equal this implies a smaller 
labor force relative to the population as a whole and therefore lower economic growth and state 
revenue than would otherwise be the case. For this reason population ageing strengthens the 
incentives for governments to do what they can to counteract this effect by improving labor 
productivity and maximizing the size of the labor force. The concern to improve labor 
productivity, combined with the increasing economic significance of technology and growing 
unemployment among low-skilled workers, plus the fact that company provision of training is 
discouraged by the possibility that other firms may poach trained employees, strengthens the 
incentives for governments to expand education and training. At the same time the desire to 
increase the size of the labor force strengthens the incentives for governments to implement more 
vigorous measures to increase fertility, increase the proportion of women working, delay 
retirement and increase immigration. 
6. More Vigorous Measures to Facilitate Structural Adjustment. 
The increasing disruption of employment caused by expanding trade and the  internationalization 
of production and finance strengthens the economic and electoral incentives for governments to 
help employees displaced by these processes through doing more to facilitate structural 
adjustment. One way of doing this is to provide more help with job search, retraining and 
financial assistance. Another option, and one that is particularly relevant in view of the fact that 
unemployment is higher among low-skilled workers, is to expand the supply of low-skilled 
service jobs by creating more low-skilled caring jobs in public sector social services and/or by 
facilitating the reduction of wages for workers in areas such as personal services in order to make 
it profitable for private employers in these areas to employ more people. 
7. More Business-Friendly Policies in General. 
In addition to the pressures to make public policy more business-friendly in specific areas there 
is also increasing pressure on governments to implement more business-friendly policies in 
general. 
First, the growth in the proportion of viewers who watch commercial TV increases the 
proportion of the electorate that is exposed to media messages framed in such a way as to favour 
business and conservative (pro-business) parties and policies. Although experts in this area stress 
that media effects on the way that people think are likely to be significant only in the long term, 
and possibly not even then, to the extent that they do exist they imply a gradual increase in the 
vote for pro-business parties, other things being equal, and therefore a larger role in government 
for such parties. More generally the growth of pro-business views in the electorate would be 
expected to increase the electoral incentives for political parties and governments of all sorts to 
espouse more pro-business policies, resulting in increasing pressure on public policy to move in 
a pro-business direction. This media effect would be magnified by the fact that increasing levels 
of education imply increasing independence of mind on the part of voters and therefore that an 
increasing proportion of voters will cast their votes on the basis of media coverage of politics 
rather than habitual party identification. Although the growth of the Internet is likely to offset 
any pro-business effect to some extent by exposing a greater proportion of the electorate to anti-
establishment views not normally carried on mainstream mass media, news on the Internet as 
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elsewhere is always likely to be dominated by organizations that have abundant resources, which 
means the state and private companies. 
The second reason to think that governments are becoming more likely to implement pro-
business policies in general is the declining political leverage of trade unions, the traditional 
antagonists of employers on labor matters, as a consequence of membership losses due to job 
losses caused by automation, the decline of manufacturing (union density is lower in most areas 
of services), the increasing difficulty of organizing workers due to the increasing diversification 
RI ZRUN JURZLQJ DIIOXHQFH WKDW ZHDNHQV ZRUNHUV¶ HFRQRPLF QHHG RI XQLRQV rising levels of 
education that increase independence of mind and thereby undermine union membership and 
solidarity, increasingly diverse lifestyles that make it less likely that employees will identify 
strongly with unions, and declining leverage vis a vis employers due to the fact that the 
increasing internationalization of production increases the credibility of disinvestment threats by 
firms. Although there are also ways in which king trends might be expected to strengthen trade 
unions, their effects are unlikely to be substantial. Rising use of ICT improves union efficacy in 
areas such as recruitment, communications, coordination of campaigns and dissemination of the 
union case but this effect is counterbalanced by the fact that employers can use ICT to their 
advantage too. Increasing independence of mind among employees due to rising levels of 
education should make them more prepared to challenge the authority and decisions of 
employers, but as we have already noted this increasing independence of mind also undermines 
union membership and solidarity, and in any case it is not clear that employees are in fact 
becoming more prepared to challenge the boss. The other way in which king trends might be 
expected to strengthen trade unions is by making employees bolder due to a reduction in 
unemployment, and in the fear of unemployment, as a consequence of reductions in the size of 
the labor force due to population ageing. Although it is difficult to compare the magnitudes of 
these effects on trade unions, it seems likely that the net effect will be to weaken them, which 
implies decreasing pressure on governments to implement union-friendly policies and decreasing 
union resistance to the implementation by governments of more business-friendly policies. 
The third reason to think that pressure to move public policy in a business-friendly 
direction in general is increasing is that working class influence on public policy is weakening 
due to a steady reduction in the proportion of traditional working class voters in the electorate as 
a consequence of automation and the decline of manufacturing employment. Other things being 
equal this implies a reduction in the vote for labor parties, a smaller role in government for such 
parties and diminishing electoral incentives for political parties and governments of all sorts to 
support the sorts of policies that benefit working class people where these conflict with the 
interests of employers.  
More Liberal Social Policies 
While king trends are pushing economic policy in a business-friendly direction in general, they 
are pushing social policy in a liberal direction in just a few respects, as follows. 
8. Less Church-Friendly Policies. 
Secularization in the form of falling religious affiliation and participation implies falling 
electoral support for parties of the right, in particular Christian parties, leading to a smaller role 
in government for these parties as well as dilution of the Christian content of the policies of these 
and other parties. It also erodes the capacity of churches to mobilize direct action. This in turn 
13 
 
implies diminishing pressure on governments to maintain financial and other assistance for 
churches and church schools and therefore a gradual erosion of state support as time goes on.  
Secularization also means that more and more people are acting, or wish to act, in ways 
that contravene traditional Christian morality but do not conflict with widely held secular norms. 
This strengthens the incentives for governments to remove laws that support or enforce 
traditional Christian morality in areas such as sexual behavior, marriage and divorce, abortion, 
family policy, the role of women, euthanasia and healthcare. 
9. More Women-Friendly Policies. 
As time goes on the political leverage of women is increasing. The fact that levels of education 
are rising faster for women than for men implies that the cognitive skills of women are rising 
relative to men. Increasing numbers of women are working, which means both that trade unions 
are likely to pursue ZRPHQ¶VLVVXHVPRUHYLJorously as the proportion of female union members 
and officials increases, and that increasing numbers of women are reaching influential positions 
in government and elsewhere. Governments wishing to maximize the size of the labor force by 
encouraging larger families are becoming convinced that women are more likely to have children 
when they are able to combine family and career than when they have to choose between them. 
And secularization is eroding the political leverage of churches and other policy actors that 
support the traditional Christian model of women as primarily wives and mothers.  
In other words, the capacity of women to pursue their goals is growing, governments 
increasingly see advantage in making it easier for women to combine work and having a family, 
and support for the traditional Christian model of the role of women is weakening. This means 
that over time we should expect governments to implement more women-friendly policies, in the 
sense of more liberal feminist policies, in areas such as reproductive rights, childcare, family 
law, violence against women, employment regulation, equal rights in general, and the allocation 
of elected and appointed public positions. 
10. More Liberal Policies on Sexuality. 
The spread of more liberal attitudes towards sexuality, reinforced by the weakening of the hold 
of Christian sexual morality due to secularization, implies increasing electoral support for 
socially liberal parties, decreasing electoral support for Christian and conservative parties, 
electorally-motivated moderation of Christian and conservative party policies on sexual 
regulation, and weakening electoral incentives for governments of all complexions to keep laws 
enforcing Christian sexual morality. As a consequence we should expect the progressive 
liberalization of regulation relating to sexual activity, such as the extension to unmarried 
homosexual and heterosexual cohabiting couples of at least some of the legal protections and 
privileges accorded to married couples in areas such as taxation, inheritance, and division of 
property when relationships end. 
We should also expect wider availability of contraception, better sex education and more 
liberal abortion laws as governments respond to the tendency of sexual liberalization in the form 
of earlier sexual activity, more sexual partners and more sex outside marriage to increase rates 
of unplanned pregnancies and sexually-transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, in the context 
of increasing openness about sex. 
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11. More Liberal Policies on the Cloning and Genetic Modification of Humans, and on 
Psychotropic Drugs. 
One of the reasons that human cloning and inheritable genetic modification are illegal 
throughout the EU is that animal testing shows that these procedures are not safe. As technology 
develops, however, this is likely to change, thereby increasing the number of would-be parents 
who would like to take advantage of them. It also seems clear that sooner or later human clones 
and designer babies will be born whatever the legal situation. Both these developments will 
increase pressure on governments to legalize the cloning and inheritable genetic modification of 
humans.  
A similar argument applies to psychotropic drugs: as scientists develop an increasing 
variety of relatively safe psychotropic drugs the number of people who would like to use them 
for work and/or recreation is likely to increase, leading to increasing pressure on governments to 
make these drugs legally available. 
Increased Public Spending 
12. Quasi-Automatic Increases in Spending on Health, Social Security and Defense. 
Spending on health, social security and the armed forces has a tendency to increase by itself 
independent of discretionary decisions made by governments due to the increasing cost of 
healthcare technology and military technology, the increasing demand for pensions, healthcare 
and services for older people caused by population ageing and the consequent increase in the 
political leverage of older people, and the increasing demand for childcare, residential services, 
community services and home-based care caused by more people living alone or heading single-
parent families and therefore lacking a second adult in the household to provide care in the case 
of illness or injury or, in the case of single parents, childcare.  
Conclusion 
The study on which this article is based was designed to obtain a synoptic view of the future 
direction of public policies in EU countries by using policy network theory and advocacy 
coalition theory to deduce the implications for public policy of all the major long-term 
technological, economic, environmental and social trends, or king trends, that I could identify 
and verify. Application of this methodology resulted in the identification of over a hundred 
policy implications, which were then condensed into 12 propositions about the future direction of 
public policy in EU Member States. Together these  propositions suggest that we should expect 
more assertive security policies, more business-friendly economic policies, more liberal social 
policies and increased public spending (Table 3).  
It is important to be quite clear what this list of 12 propositions represent. It is not a list of 
observed current policy trends extrapolated into the future but a list of the policy implications of 
king trends. And it is not a prediction of future trends in public policy but a list of those we 
would expect insofar as policy network theory and advocacy coalition theory correctly specify 
how king trends influence public policy, the king trends are correctly identified, and this 
influence is not obscured by events, personalities and other short-term and unpredictable factors. 
Another way of putting this is to say that these 12 points describe the directions in which public 
policy in Europe would move if only the 19 king trends were in operation, governments took the 
line of least resistance and nothing else changed much, with short-term fluctuations cancelling 
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each other out and no major disruptive events. The actual future of public policy as it emerges 
can be thought of as a variation of this scenario.  
 
Table 3. Net policy implications of king trends 
General 
categories 
Implications 
More assertive 
security policies 
1. More assertive foreign and security policies 
2. More intrusive and internationalized law enforcement 
More business-
friendly 
economic 
policies 
3. Increasingly favourable policies towards expanding firms and sectors 
4. Priority for securing energy supplies over mitigating climate change 
5. More vigorous measures to increase the size and quality of the labour 
force  
6. More vigorous measures to facilitate structural adjustment 
7. More business-friendly policies in general 
More liberal 
social policies 
8. Less church-friendly policies 
9. More women-friendly policies 
10. More liberal policies on sexuality 
11. More liberal policies on the cloning and inheritable genetic 
modification of humans, and on psychotropic drugs 
Increased public 
spending 
12. Quasi-automatic increases in spending on health, social security and 
defence 
 
The significance of this for those trying to build a better future by influencing public policy 
is that in specifying the directions in which public policy is likely to go, king trends theory also 
identifies the directions in which it is likely to be easy or difficult to push public policy. 
Awareness of the above scenario should therefore improve our ability to maximize 
implementation of our preferred policies, whatever these are, by enabling us to better target our 
efforts and resources on the pursuit of policy shifts that have a reasonable chance of coming to 
pass. Among other things this implies pursuing policy goals via policy instruments that are in 
line with the future policy trends specified by king trends theory, such as market-based 
instruments. It also implies dropping pursuit of policy shifts that are considered to be of 
relatively low priority where these run counter to the long-term policy trends identified above. 
King trends theory may appear to place more emphasis on structure than on agency, but to the 
extent that it yields a realistic picture of future policy trends ± and it is the only synoptic picture 
of the long-term future of public policy that is based on realistic theories of how public policy is 
made - awareness of its findings should improve our capacity as purposive agents to influence 
the direction of public policy. 
 
Acknowledgements: 
I would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust for the Research Fellowship that enabled me to carry 
out this study. 
16 
 
REFERENCES 
Compston, Hugh. 2006. King trends and the future of public policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Dowding, Keith. 1995. Model or metaphor? a critical review of the policy network approach. 
Political Studies 43: 136-58. 
Parsons, D.W. 1995. Public policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Rhodes, R.A.W. 1985. Power-dependence, policy communities and intergovernmental networks. 
Public Administration Bulletin 49: 4-31. 
Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank Jenkins-Smith. 1999. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: an 
assessment. In Theories of the Policy Process. Ed. Sabatier, Paul A., 117-66. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
 
